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Resumo 
O objetivo deste artigo é discutir a relação da abertura econômica e do impacto das 
reformas institucionais na participação do produto de cada país na produção global. Para 
tanto, é desenvolvido simulações econômicas, a qual é uma abordagem alternativa que 
utiliza técnicas matemáticas e deduções para resolver um modelo objetivo. A simulação 
econômica deste trabalho reflete que o nível de abertura econômica é um importante fator de 
peso para possíveis alterações institucionais nas economias. Nota-se que, nos países com 
nível de abertura baixa, o custo do capital é o principal entrave para o crescimento 
econômico. E, naquelas economias com alto nível de abertura, a maior dinâmica compensa 
os problemas causados pelo custo do capital. Quando comparados os dois tipos de reformas 
(contínua versus pontual), a reforma "contínua" apresenta um ganho de qualidade mais 
expressivo do produto relativo do que a reforma "pontual".  
 
Palavras Chave - Crescimento Econômico, Simulação Econômica e Reformas 
Institucionais. 
 
Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to discuss the relationship of the openness and the 
impact of institutional reforms in the participation of the product of individual countries in 
global output. Therefore, it is based on economic simulations, a type of alternative approach 
that uses mathematical techniques and deductions to solve an objective model. The 
economic simulation of this work reflects that the trade opening level is an important factor 
of weight for possible institutional alterations in the economies. It is noticeable that, in the 
countries with low opening level, the cost of the capital is the main setback for the economic 
growth. And, in those economies with high opening level, the largest dynamics would 
compensate the problems caused by the cost of the capital. When compared the two types of 
reforms (continuous versus punctual), the "continuous" reform  will bring a more expressive 
gain quality of the relative product than the "punctual" reform.  
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1. Introduction 
There is a dominant perception that institutions are key for explaining the perennial 
technical progress, which gained a prominent role for explaining the large differences in 
output per capta among countries (Easterly and Levine, 2002; Barro, 1998; Ranis and 
Stewart, 2001). There is also a growing perception that we should examine the process of 
economic growth, its basis and its effects, taking into account the economic interpendence 
among countries (Helpman, 2004; Acemoglu and Ventura, 2002).  
 
We examine the relationship between trade openness and the institutional quality 
upon countries’ growth performance by working out some economic simulations based on 
Acemoglu and Ventura’s (2002) growth model. In the present case, the numerical 
computational analysis, which have some advantages over the traditional comparative 
statistics, will enable us to work out interesting economic scenarios involving changes in 
trade liberalization and institutional reforms.  
 
 Institutions are, here, considered in a broad sense. No doubt, properties rights and the 
rule of law are crucial features for reducing the risks to investors, that is, for granting good 
contracts and enforcing them (Easterly and Levine, 2002). The same applies to the existence 
of undistorted prices for preventing misalocation of domestic resources and promoting 
market competition (Helpman, 2004; North, 1990; Barro, 1998). Yet, despite the prominent 
role of sound microeconomic foundation over macroeconomic ones1, in the long run, we 
should include the latter in a broad notion of institutional quality. That is why we rather use 
the concept of Institutional barrier, as better explained in the paper.  
 
            The model of Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) consists of a global economy where 
countries trade intermediate goods based on ricardian characteristics (differences in 
productivity) and the quality of institutions create conditions for sustained economic growth. 
Economic simulations enable us to better track behaviors of certain variables, and the main 
impact analysis are divided, in the present analysis, into two main groups: the first involving 
economies A (developed economy) and B (economy in the progressive development); and 
the second involving economies B and C (economy in the stagnant developing). These two 
main groups are further divided into four tests per group, in which changes in the variable 
“Institutional Barrier” and the level of trade openness are tested. All the simulations of the 
economic model will be rotated in Matlab, using the SOR iterative numerical method. 
 
 The remainder of this paper is structured into three parts. Section one presents the 
formulation of the economic model. The second section presents the economic simulations 
and their results. Finally, we conclude. 
 
2. Structure of the Economic Model 
We take Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) model for reference, which consists of an 
imperfectly competitive ricardian model where international trade is restricted to 
intermediate goods. Domestic and foreign products are imperfect substitutes, but their 
market power is limited to the prices of exported goods, not extending to imported goods, 
                                                          
1
 Even episodes of a general macroeconomic statibity among developing countries, which Rodrik (1999) assigns to external shocks 
amplified by delayed (domestic) stabilization policies, were found out to be better explained by delayed reforms (Cinquetti and Silva, 
2008).  
  
since they would be small in the world economy. Otherwise, countries would face flat 
demand and the accumulation of capital would not affect the terms of trade. That is what 
makes constant returns to scale compatible with diminishing returns, as consequence of 
economic growth, or else how international trade grants a stable distribution of world 
income. In addition, this model consists of a global economy where countries differences in 
productivity and/or technology. These countries are able to influence the prices of goods 
they export but not those of imported goods. 
 
In order to describe the model we use an AK2 model to demonstrate how economic 
reforms and efficient policies improve trade among countries. Thus, countries that have 
carried out the necessary reforms have a greater capacity for economic growth than do those 
who have not. In addition, countries that adopt “irresponsible” economic policies generate 
unstable growth (Gries and Meierrieksy, 2010; Commander and Nikoloski, 2010; Aisen and 
Veiga, 2011; Dias and Tebaldi, 2011). 
 
2.1. Institutional Barriers 
The variable “Institutional Barrier” proposed in this paper has aim to denominating 
and expressing mathematically a variable related to the institutional quality of countries, as 
proposed by Acemoglu (2009). This allows countries to have different levels of productivity 
because of different technologies and economic policies.  
 
The mathematical formulation of this variable is based on equations Wavelet, and 
this type of equation is generally used in signal analysis. The purpose of using this 
formulation is to produce an amplitude component and another component related to a 
temporal movement. 
 
Thus, we consider the “Institutional Barrier” variable to be: 
 
f(macroeconomic stability3 and core microeconomic foundations4) 
 
We can then mathematically express it as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ]ttTtGtrEXPAt jjjbasjj θβββξ .... 321 +−+=
        (1) 
and  
 
 
                                                          
2
 The AK model is an endogenous growth model, and its name originates from the mathematical representation of the Cobb–Douglas 
production function:  
aa LAKY −= 1  
 
where Y represents the total output of the economy, A represents TFP, K is capital, L is work, and the parameter measures the elasticity of 
output to capital. To display constant returns to scale, we have the special case in which the production function becomes linear to capital. 
Thus, in this case, the Cobb–Douglas function takes the following form:  
AKY =  
 
3
 For more details: (Borio, 2011; Gerry, Lee and Mickiewicz, 2010; Satyanath and Subramanian, 2004; Ocampo, 2005). 
 
4
 In this paper, the core microeconomic foundations are productive efficiency, allocative efficiency, and property rights. 
0,, 321 >βββ
( ) =tjξ
where ( )trbasj  is the basic interest rate of economy j; ( )tG j  is government expenditure in the 
economy j; ( )tT j  is government revenue in economy j; t  is the period, 321 ,, βββ  are the 
sensitivity parameters of the “Institutional Barrier” variable with regard to monetary, fiscal, 
and the microeconomic foundations of economy j; A  is the history of the “Institutional 
Barrier” variable in economy j until time t = 0 (this parameter is what determines the initial 
position of economy j at the beginning of the study); and ( )tjθ  are the microeconomic 
foundations of economy j. Besides, it is appropriate to comment on the variables located 
within the brackets of equation (1): those on the left  represent 
macroeconomic stability (the monetary and fiscal policies of country j) and those on the 
right 
 
represent the conditions of the microeconomic distortions of country j. As a 
result, high values for the basic interest rate, lack of public finances, and high 
microeconomic distortions cause a relatively high value for the “Institutional Barrier” 
variable, which would hinder economic development. 
 
2.2. Solution of the Global Economy 
The complete characterization of the world distribution of income in steady state is 
given by the following pair of equations:  
 
The cost of capital5 of country j: 
 
                                                  ( )[ ] jgr jjj τρξ 1** +=                          (2) 
 
where *jr  is the cost of capital, jξ  is the “Institutional Barrier,” jρ  is the discount rate, *g  
is the rate of growth of global output, and jτ  is the openness of the economy. Thus, the 
higher the “Institutional Barrier,” the higher the discount rate, and the lower the trade 
openness of country j, the higher is its cost of capital. 
 
And the equation for the relative products of country j: 
( )[ ]( )j jgy jjjj τερξµ −+= 1**                     (3) 
                                                              
( ) ( )tYtYy jj ≡*   
where ( )tY j  represents the products of country j and ( )tY  represents the products 
worldwide. 
 
Equation (3) shows that countries that have better levels of technology (high jµ ), 
lower “Institutional Barrier” values (low ), and lower discount rates (low jρ ) are 
relatively wealthier. It also points out that the elasticity of output with respect to  and jρ  
depends on the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods, jε , and the level of 
                                                          
5
  Acemoglu (2009),  pg 668, says: “Our assumption that each country is small implies that each exports practically all of its production of 
intermediates and imports the ideal basket of intermediates form the world economy. Consequently ( ) ( )trtp jj =  is not only the price of 
intermediates produced by country j but also its terms of trade – defined as the price of the exports of a country divided by the price of its 
imports”.       
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )tTtGtr jjbasj −+ .. 21 ββ
( )( )tjθβ .3
jξ
jξ
openness, jτ . 
 
3. Simulation of the Economic Model 
The economic model of Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) demonstrates that the trade 
openness and institutional barriers are relevant for economic growth. Even so, analysis of 
the impact of these variables on the product of countries requires a numerical sense. For this 
purpose, we use a numerical simulation in order to test changes in these two variables. 
 
The model has 11 structural parameters and two main equations. In order to calculate 
the dynamic trajectories of the endogenous variables of the system we must first set the 
values of structural parameters. To do so, we assign them numerical values that can be found 
in real-world economies. Specifically, we consider for the countries of the simulation: (i) 
that the variables related to macroeconomic stability do not interfere in the products of any 
of the economies ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )0=−+ tTtGtr jjbasj ; (ii) a global growth rate in steady state ( *g ) 
of 2% per period; (iii) an elasticity of substitution among the  intermediate  goods in country 
j  and the rest  of the world ( ) at a value of 26;  (iv) an indicator of the relative weights of 
the products of the countries ( ) equal to 17; and (v) discount rates ( jρ ) of 0,7, 0,75, and 
0,8 for economies A, B, and C, respectively. The other parameters jξ , jθ , and jτ  are 
variable parameters, which are the objects tested in the simulation. We also include 
parameters used in numerical modeling (tol and number of iterations). 
 
In order to present the simulation results, the tests were divided into two main 
groups: the first involving economies A and B and the second involving economies B and C. 
These two groups were divided into four tests per group, in which changes were tested in 
“Institutional Barrier” and the level of trade openness. The parameters of economy B were 
the same in all tests: 75,0=Bρ ; 35,0=Bτ ; and 35,0−=Bθ . It is worth noting that this 
economy had already carried out strong institutional reforms. The discount rates of the other 
two economies (A and C) were also constant during all tests, with values of 70,0=Aρ  and 
80,0=Cρ .  
3.1. Tests performed in the simulation of the economic model 
The two equations presented in section 2 were run in Matlab using the parameters 
described above for a time horizon of 20 periods. In order to solve the linear system of this 
simulation it is necessary to find the inverse of the matrix containing the terms of the trade 
of the economies; however, this is a task somewhat complicated using direct methods. Thus, 
it was necessary to use an iterative numerical method to calculate successive approximations 
to the solution of the system. We chose the SOR Method (Succesive Over Relaxation) using 
                                                          
6
 The purpose of using the value of 2 for jε  is not based on any microeconomic assumption, beyond  the  supposition  of  Acemoglu  and  
Ventura  (2002)  that   1>ε   in  order  to    avoid  “immiserizing growth.” Thus, the value used here is 2=ε  in order to facilitate the 
simulation, because equation (3) has the exponent 




 −
τ
ε1
, and thus, in the simulation, this would be 





−
τ
1
. 
7
 The values jε  and jµ  were kept constant for all countries in order to simplify the simulation. In this way, all countries present the 
same preferences between domestic and imported goods, and related products have the same weight (even technological advances). 
jε
jµ
a maximum number of iterations, an initial approach and a tolerance for convergence (Judd, 
1998).  
 
3.1.1 Description of the test procedures of the simulation of the economic model 
 
 In test 1, we tested a change in the behavior of economy A, which initially presented 
conditions that hindered economic growth ( 15,0=Aθ ) but then (in period 11) carried out 
institutional reforms ( 09,0' −=Aθ ). For test 1, the level of trade openness of economy A was 
35,0=Aτ . The second test considered the same conditions as the first apart from the level 
of trade openness of economy A, 70,0' =Aτ . The third test showed the same structure as the 
first. However, the difference here was the absence of institutional reforms, which allowed 
economy A to waste products until the end of the test. Furthermore, the last test, involving 
economies A and B, reflected the same test conditions, just by changing the level of trade 
openness of economy A, 70,0' =Aτ . 
 
In tests 5–8, we repeated the same procedure as that used in tests 1 to 4. The 
difference was that this sequence of tests aimed at “continuous” institutional change in 
economy C. This initially presented an institutional structure of low quality ( 3,0=Cθ ), with 
reforms carried out in period 11. Therefore, in test 5, the reforms continued after retirement, 
with an initial value of 3,0' −=Cθ , and its conditions improved period to period until the end 
of the test. Test 6 considered the same conditions as test 5 apart from the level of trade 
openness of economy C, 70,0' =Cτ . Now the test 7 was formed using the same structure set 
as that of test 5. However, this test no included institutional reforms. Furthermore, in test 8, 
we used the same test conditions as those in test 7, only changing the trade openness of 
economy C 70,0' =Cτ . 
 
3.2 Simulation results 
 
The last three paragraphs were used to present the tests used in the simulation of the 
economic model, whereas here, the aim is to discuss the results of these tests. Thus, this item 
is divided into two sub-items: the first discusses the results obtained by the trade openness of 
countries, and the second discusses the dynamic behavior of the "Institutional Barrier". 
 
3.2.1 Dynamic behavior of the level of opening of the countries, : 
 
 The first parameter tested was the level of openness of the three economies. Figure 1 
displays the results of this test. As mentioned, economy A had low quality before carrying 
out institutional reforms in period 11. Thereafter there was a recovery in the products for this 
economy. Note, however, that this change was mild (1,78% gain in the product relative to 
economy A). This feature is explained by the low value of the level of trade openness of this 
economy, 35,0=Aτ . This is corroborated by comparing Figures 1 and 2: it is clear that the 
effects of test 2 show a greater intensity than those presented in test 1 (in the second test, the 
gain in the products in the economy A is 13,31%). This behavior is also seen in comparisons 
of tests 3 and 4 (Figures 3 and 4), 5 and 6 (Figures 5 and 6), and 7 and 8 (Figures 7 and 8). 
In this second group of tests on economies B and C, the gain in intensity by increasing the 
level of openness is even greater than that presented by economies A and B, and the gain in 
economy C in test 5 is 2,71%, whereas in test 6, it is 22,36%. These results corroborate the 
jτ
works of: Federici and Montalbano, 2009; Haddad, Lim and Saborowski, 2010; Székely and 
Sámano, 2012; and Binici, Cheyng and Lai, 2012. 
 
 
                      
   Figure 1 – Results of relative products obtained from test 1.                      Figure 2 – Results of relative products obtained from test 2.  
                        
  Figure 3 – Results of relative product obtained from test 3.                        Figure 4 – Results of relative products obtained by test 4.  
 
 
                        
  Figure 5 – Results of relative products obtained from test 5.                      Figure 6 – Results of relative products obtained from test 6.  
 
                     
  Figure 7 – Results of relative products obtained from test 7.                     Figure 8 – Results of relative products obtained from test 8. 
 
One explanation for this large difference in value caused by the level of trade 
openness is presented in the figures that show the results for the cost of capital (Figures 9–
12 for economies A and B and Figures 13–16 for economies B and C). We note that the cost 
of capital is the major impediment to economic development in the tests that have a low 
level of trade openness (Figures 9, 11, 13, and 15), whereas in the other tests, the most 
dynamic caused by the greater level of openness makes the "Institutional Barrier" factor 
relevant to the changes in relative productivity. Therefore, a very open economy that carries 
out institutional reforms will display more significant gains than a relatively closed 
economy. Thus, level of openness is a measure of the weight of changes that occur in a 
given country. This implies that a country that has relatively greater openness will suffer 
more during crises and will benefit more in times of prosperity. 
 
 
                     
   Figure 9 – Results of the cost of capital obtained from test 1.                Figure 10 – Results of the cost of capital obtained from test 2.  
 
                      
   Figure 11 – Results of the cost of capital obtained from test 3.                Figure 12 – Results of the cost of capital obtained from test 4.  
 
                    
   Figure 13 – Results of the cost of capital obtained from test 5.                Figure 14 – Results of the cost of capital obtained from test 6.  
 
                  
  Figure 15 – Results of the cost of capital obtained from test 7.                 Figure 16 – Results of the cost of capital obtained from test 8.  
 
 
3.2.2 The dynamic behavior of the “Institutional Barrier” variable of countries, jξ : 
 
 The second test focuses on the behavior of “Institutional Barrier.” As mentioned 
above, we carried out two types of reforms, namely “punctual” reforms that maintain the 
same value of jθ in the post-reform period until the end of the test and “continuous” reforms 
in which the institutional quality of the economy in question increases each period. Note, by 
comparing the test 2 (Figure 2) with the test 6 (Figure 6), that the reform "continuous" will 
gain a more expressive quality of the relative product on the reform “punctual". Another 
highlight is the fact that in tests with low level of trade openness (Figures 1, 3, 5 and 7), the 
economy with lower quality institutional do not require reforms intense and urgent, because 
even on losing product, this loss is softer than if it had a greater level of openness. Thus, 
economies that have greater trade openness should be more concerned about the quality of 
their institutions, because this causes the greatest potential for greater openness. In 
summary, economies that have low levels of trade openness have lower perceptions of poor 
institutional quality, whereas economies that have high levels of trade openness, if they 
suffer quality loss in their institutions, should seek to carry out urgent institutional reforms 
or face deteriorating economies over time. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The primary objective of this paper is to discuss the relationship of the openness and 
the impact of institutional reforms in the participation of the product of individual countries 
in global output. The first test scenario would be a reform “punctual” keeping the same 
value of the post-reform until the end of the test; a second test would be a reform scenario 
"continuous", in which, each period, increases the quality of institutional economics in 
question.  
 
 The simulated trajectories showed that the level of trade openness is an important 
factor that affects institutional changes in economies. We have shown that in countries that 
have low levels of openness, the cost of capital is the main obstacle to economic 
development, because they use relatively more domestic capital goods compared with 
intermediate goods in their production. Furthermore, economies that have high levels of 
trade openness, the greater dynamic offset the problems caused by the cost of capital. 
 
When comparing the two types of reforms, the reform "continuous" will gain a more 
expressive quality of the product on the reform of the "punctual”. Other conclusion is that 
the economies that have greater openness should be more concerned about the quality of 
their institutions, and economies with low level of trade openness, if its were with low 
institutional quality, there would be no need for reforms intense and urgent. 
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